Glimpses of the Revolts

Glimpses of the Revolts

Tunisia: the Spark
The wave of revolts and revolutions in MENA started with the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouzizi in Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia. The young man, 26, lighted himself in protest against frustrating repression by police, which destroyed his petty trade and humiliated him (and his family) on the market street of Tunis. This action was only a spark for the already latent anger of the masses, especially the youth and the working class, who took the Bouzizi’s suicide approach to the level of massive protests in the country. Despite widespread brutality by the hated but chronically corrupt police force, the protests got stronger and wider with youths from communities, schools, and working class elements, organizing from the grassroots to the national levels.

The strength of the protests compelled the pro-regime trade union leadership, UGTT, to declare a strike after much delay, which finally collapsed the regime. Before this time, workers from workplaces and communities have declared strikes; and even drove out local managements of workplaces. The Tunisian working class launched a wave of rolling regional strikes culminating in a general strike. Based on this show of class strength by the working class, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the corrupt president had to be sacrificed by the capitalist class who were fearful of the dangerous direction the revolt was taking. Thus, on 14 January 2011, Ben Ali and his family fled to Saudi Arabia (run by another corrupt and repressive ultra-right theocratic regime) ending 23 years of corrupt and repressive regime. Consequently, the power was on the streets.

However, because of lack of genuine working class platform, coupled with the political bankruptcy of the official trade unions, the capitalist class was able to stage a comeback to power. To show the readiness of the working masses to take power, following the police crackdown and sponsorship of terror by fascist elements of the regime, working class elements and youths, organized themselves into some form of state power; organizing transport, movement, etc. while mass meetings were organized regularly. In Redeyef, there was no authority other than that of the trade unions. The police station was burnt down; the town hall was taken over by local unions, which has its headquarters there, while the local judges fled. They set up committees to deal with transport, public order, local services, etc. All of this shows the readiness of the working class and youths to take power; only a working class leadership would have linked these committees together on a national plane, and for a revolutionary government of this.

Even when a new government was formed after Ben Ali was ousted; the working masses did not rest on their oars. They rejected the ridiculous regime comprising elements of Ben Ali ousted regime and his party, RCD; and the five so-called leaders of the opposition movements (who sold out the movement to the capitalist class in order to share power). This mass rejection through continued protests led to the resignation of the five opposition members in the regime; which led to the then prime minister, Mohammed Gannouchi first reshuffling his ridiculous cabinet and subsequently resigning on the 27th February, while Beji Caid Essebsi was made the prime minister.

From all of these developments, it could be deduced that the struggle of the working people against the capitalist class refused to go, while the ruling stratum and imperialism tried to buy off the revolution or to behead it using various guises. Aside the masses refusing to let go the gains of the revolutions, vis-à-vis allowing the elements of the old regime to resurface, they attempted to forge ahead with the revolutionary course. This explains the growing movements after the Essebsi government was formed (which ironically involved some so-called oppositions and parties, including some left parties). For instance, in the wake of pronouncement by former interior minister that the military would take over, if Ben Ali acolytes did not win elections (and that the old regime would still be in charge), there were waves of protests around the country which frightened the regime. Also on 2011 May Day, youths and working people, gathering in hundreds of thousands around the country have called for a second revolution, in the face of failure of the ruling regime in moving society forward. These are aside several protests around the country by workers, demanding one improvement or the other (example of which are the protests for wage increments, jobs, removal of the officials of the old regime, etc), along with many factory and workplace occupations, takeovers and sit-ins.

Of course, the election into the 217-member constituent assembly On 23 October, 2011 to draw the constitution, and the subsequent election into the national assembly saw the emergence of the right-wing Islamist Ennhada leading with 37 percent in the constituent assembly, and around the same percentage for the national assembly. But this does not really portray the revolution as a religiously based one. Indeed, mass of workers, youths and activists were opposed to attempt of not just emergence of Islamists, but also attempt at turning the Tunisian society into a theocratic and autocratic state, despite attempt of the Ennhada-led tripartite government at introducing anti-democratic policies. For instance, there was attempt at forming a workers’ party at a point during the revolution, while the leftists, trade unionists and youths who wanted to move the revolution forward actually formed a Popular Front, which saw the election of leftwing members of parliament. More than this, the Popular Front organized mass actions to defend the gains of the revolution.

The emergence of Ennahda, other Islamist parties and also pro-Ben Ali elements (who had organized under new political formation after the banning of the RCD), had less to do with the waning of the revolution or the victory of counter-revolution, but more to do with absence of a strong, class conscious political platform of the working people and youths. The absence of this bold alternative was exploited by various sections of the rightwing to gain prominence. But the continued failure of all this strands of the rightwing to move the revolution forward will continue to fire up the mass revolt. It is no accident that since the emergence of the Ennhada-led government, there were “more than 40,000 strikes, over 120,000 sit-ins, and around 200,000 demonstrations” have occurred throughout the country. Trade union movement is also growing in strength as a result of this development. The rise in mass incidents (strikes, protests, sit-ins, etc) is product on one hand of the growing economic downturn and the failure of the right-wing leadership to resolve any of the problems facing the society post-revolt.

More than this, they are also reaction to the attempt of the capitalist class, led by Ennhada government to throw back the little gains of the revolution, and launch counter-revolution. This is what has led to the murder of the two leftwing members of parliament, which is traceable to the government, either directly or through its religious-divisive policies and body language. For instance, Sabhi Atik, leader of the Ennahda bloc in the Constituent Assembly, was reported to have vowed at a forum “anyone who takes out a license against legitimacy will meet with a licence to have his bloodshed on the streets.” The death of second leftwing member of parliament, Mohamed Brahmi in August, 2013 (following the murder of another member of parliament, Chokri Belaid in late 2012) , led to widespread mass protests and sit-ins, which in many respect was a semi-revolt, with the Ennhada troika government in disarray. In some areas, like Bouzid, Gafsa, etc, revolts actually place, with governments in such areas suspended in mid-air. These developments have radicalized younger generations and working class, and placed the question of what to do to take the revolution forward on the front burner of debate.

The capitalist class and imperialism have looked for all means to behead the movement: stop it from either going further or spreading to other countries. They have been using all available means, one of which is the $20 billion loan (a real death trap for Tunisia) promised by the G8 to the country. Surely, the revolution has shown what can be achieved by the working class. Of course, some upper middle class/lower capitalist class and the upper echelons of the capitalist class have tried to sponsor some divisive tendencies to discredit further movement, the preponderance of consciousness on the side of further revolutionary movement have overcome this so far. (Further analysis about the future prospects of the revolution to be given in subsequent part of this work).

Egypt: The Bulwark of Arab Revolution
If Tunisia is the spark that ignited the torch of the Middle Eastern and North African revolutions, Egypt showed the huge revolutionary enthusiasm amongst the working people and youth in the Arab world, who were hitherto described as too religious and docile for revolution. Indeed, the Egyptian capitalist state – safe for the brief period of the Abdel Nasser’s rule – used to be a bastion of imperialist reaction (along with the corrupt Saudi Arabia monarchy), serving as prison warder for not only imperialist exploitation of the working class in Egypt but indeed, in the whole region, especially the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories.

Following the heroism of Tunisian working and young people, workers and youths in Egypt, through real-time and online mobilization, started mass protests as from 25th of January 2011. By the midnight of 28 January, tens of thousands “protested on the streets of Egypt’s major cities” (Wikipedia, MENA Revolutions 2011,  www.wikipedia.org ). The beleaguered Mubarak regime ceded all presidential power to his newly chosen vice president, Omar Suleiman (the first in 30 years), who was a former head of the pro-CIA, pro-Israeli intelligence unit of the regime, the General Intelligence Directorate, (which had helped Israel repress, kill and maim many Palestinians); in order to buy off the revolt. This was in combination with repression by the police and the sponsored shock troopers who stormed the Tahrir Square, where hundreds of thousands gathered, to disperse the revolutionary movement.

The peak of Mubarak’s terror was the withdrawal of police from the streets and unleashing his shock troopers to loot and maim in the neighbourhoods in order to cause chaos and disorder on the streets and in neighbourhoods; and thus discredit the revolutionary movement. This was countered by the protesting masses who organized vigilante groups around neighbourhoods and communities while women moved en mass to Tahrir Square for safety. Of course, the pro-Mubarak regime elements tried to take the initiative to cause chaos, attacking people in the communities but the massive victory in the Tahrir Square against the shock troopers led to the defeat of these elements. Attempt by Mubarak to cling on to power exemplified by his rash speech – his last; rather than quelled the movement, actually led to massive protests of up to a million working people, youths, pensioners and even professionals like doctors, lawyers, etc, in Tarhir Square and other centres of protests across the country. The ruling capitalist class, having seen that it cannot continue to rule with Mubarak had to ease him out of office to safeguard the system, using the military section.

The takeover of rein of power by the top notch of the military and their refusal to insure Mubarak at the beginning of the revolution is a reflection of the strength of the revolutionary movement. Aside the fact that the rank and file of the soldiers comprise of people, who are drawn from working class and peasant families, and live in their conditions (which necessitated their fraternity with the revolutionary movement), the military top echelon, knew that they were the last to safe the system. If they decide to face the masses in a combat, aside the possibility of schism in the ranks of the military, with the sizable proportion of the lower and middle layers moving over to the side of the revolution (as seen later in Libya), there would have been no authority that would disguise ‘neutrality’ to negotiate with the revolutionary movement. This Bonarpartist role of the military sub-class of the capitalist class (trying to balance amongst classes) is really meant to safeguard the capitalist system in its neo-liberal phase.

Just like the Tunisian revolution, the working class tried to assert itself and put its feet in the movement through general strike and various massive protests from communities to regional levels. Indeed, it was the workers’ strike in the country, especially in the strategic Suez region (where a sizable proportion of regional trade – about 5 percent of the world trade – pass through as a result of the presence of Suez Canal), that led to the final easing out of Mubarak. Moreover, elements of class rule existed when workers occupied factories, while youths and workers took over some local governments, organized transport, etc. If there had been a pan-national working class party or movement, class rule of the oppressed would have resulted from this initiative. But the so-called left parties are so small while their distorted ideas about working class movement prevented them from gaining national echo; while the pro-state trade union movement leadership paved the way for the takeover of the revolutionary movement by the pro-capitalist opposition, majorly represented by the right-wing Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. Despite this, the working class and youth mobilized to defend their interests, including rights to protest and organize while also demanding the trial of the old regime elements; provision of jobs; end of rotten alliance with the Israeli regime against the Palestinians; etc. The military regime in its fragile state, responded by conceding to some of the demands, combining this with elements of repression (like the arrest of online commentators, banning strike in some industrial sectors, etc.), where it could get away with them. In response, and in an attempt to head off the movement, some opposition elements and groups were co-opted into the new regime (including some left groups).

While initially there was rapid trial of some elements of Mubarak regime, including Mubarak himself, his children and former interior minister, this has been as result of the threat posed by the human flood of the Second Revolution Movement since late May 2012; and not product of any well thought out plan or policy of the regime. This implies that the military-propped regime was only bidding time when the movement will be in ebb where it would have enough authority to launch a full counter-revolution. This is what has happened since the second revolution against the Morsi/MB government, which led unfortunately to the re-emergence of the military in power. Hosni Mubarak was moved from prison into so-called “military hospital”, which effectively meant his release. This was clearly a counter-revolutionary action as the trial of Mubarak himself was a product of mass movement, which threatened the rule of capital. To underscore the readiness of the military ruler to roll back the revolution, Muhammed Morsi, and several other Muslim Brotherhood members have replaced Mubarak in prisons and detentions.

Elections were also postponed until mid-2012 – an attempt by the military junta and its imperialist backers to try to stave off any political movement that can jeopardize their interests when they vacate power. The mass movement of people in their hundreds of thousands reemerged – the strongest being the December 2011 movements – to demand immediate elections. However, as a result of the lack of clear-cut working class, revolutionary movement playing a central role in these activities, various shades of politicians especially within the bourgeois set up, and the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood trend, only used these protests to negotiate power with the ruling junta. Of course, there was an attempt to set up a form of workers’ party, but without clear democratic socialist programmes, this could not yield a mass response and acceptance.

Just like in Tunisia, the Islamist movement, Muslim Brotherhood (MB), through its party, Freedom and Justice Party, became the immediate electoral beneficiary of the revolution. Of course, as said earlier, this was after it had played various dubious roles during the revolts. For instance, the movement that saw the ouster of Mubarak was not actually approved by the leadership of the MB, but its rank and file, especially the youth layer, participated actively in the revolts and movements. The leadership was only dragged into accepting the movement when it was sure of victory. In fact, on many occasions, the leadership of MB tried to limit the participation of its members, for instance during the Second Revolutionary movement, to commemorate the first anniversary of the revolution and challenge the rule of the military. The MB during this time was engrossed in negotiation with the military rulers and imperialism on how to diffuse the movement and provide safe landing for capitalism in Egypt.

The emergence of MB in power is not such a straightforward question. It was more of a choice between the lesser evil of continuation of military evil or emergence of a new evil. Despite the widespread network and structure of MB, it could not gain an outright win in the first round of the election. Aside having to contend with the military/pro-Mubarak candidate, Ahmed Shafik (an army general and former minister and later prime minister under Mubarak regime), there also emerged a radical Nasserite candidate, Hamdeen Sabbahi, who gained significant votes during the first round of the election in May 2012 (coming third with less than 2 percent of the votes behind Shafik). The second round of the election only saw MB candidate, Mohammed Morsi leading the military candidate, Shafik with just 51 percent of the votes.

However, the MB leadership had struck accord with the military and imperialism prior to the election, with the aim of keeping intact the pro-Mubarak military structure, as a condition for being declared the winner of the election. Despite huge mass movement behind it, the MB leadership tried to arrest the mass movement that was pressuring the military ruler to declare Morsi as president. The military tried to ensure this by limiting the power of the incoming president on salient defence, political and economic matters, making it effectively a lame duck. For instance, military-inspired decrees make the defence independent of government. Truly, the Morsi/MB government repudiated many of the compromises it made with the military, but this was meant to consolidate the MB in power rather than democratizing the country. The military top leaders were retired while the Constituent Assembly, pronounced illegal by the pro-Mubarak court was recalled by Morsi.

While this infuriated the military, it did not challenge imperialism or capitalism in the country. Indeed, Morsi/MB government’s aim was to consolidate power and practice its own capitalism. On the other hand, attempt at consolidating power without addressing the economic impasse only meant the Morsi replacing Mubarak as a dictator. Anti-democratic and anti-labour laws were promulgated or supported by Morsi and MB parliamentarians. The worst of this anti-democratic action was the absolute power Morsi granted himself in November 2012, undermining court and Constituent Assembly. Of course, this was justified on the excuse of bypassing pro-Mubarak judges, but this actually reflected the bankruptcy of the MB politics vis-à-vis its compromise with the military and imperialism, and its attempt at beheading the revolution. Its politics is to build its own power. It is no accident then that all the key political and administrative positions were held by MB loyalists, many with anti-democratic and anti-worker outlook. This meant introducing and enforcing MB’s ethics and culture on people. One of such is the totalitarian principle that ensures absolute obedience to the directive of the rulers. This, in a period where mass of workers and youths are trying to reverse the counter-revolutionary actions of the military, only exposed the MB as another version of the totalitarian state.

Economically and socially, the MB/Morsi government could not move society forward. Economic situation continued to worsen. Since Morsi took over “the percentage of vulnerable households that claim that their income does not cover their monthly expenditures increased from 78.9% in September 2011, to 86% in September 2012, and to 88.9% in March 2013” meanwhile “consumer prices for food and beverages increased by 13.9% between July 2012 and July 2013, according to a Civil Societies’ report. Furthermore, there were attacks on workers’ rights while youth unemployment rose to as much as over 23 percent. Over 4000 companies closed down, with government doing nothing. All of this has meant, “In 2012, almost 4000 social protests occurred, which is almost double the number of protests witnessed in 2011. Of these, 2, 757 occurred after electing Morsi in June. The number of protests continued to increase, reaching 5094 social protests in the first half of 2013 alone. All of these protests were calling for basic social rights, such as access to clean drinking water, access to electricity, good-quality education, better health services, better wages and salaries, and many other entitlements. Egypt’s foreign currency reserves in turn dropped from $36bn in January 2011 to $14.4bn in April 2013.  34 percent of Egyptians in July, 2013 – just before Morsi’s ouster – claimed that they are suffering as against 23 percent in January, while less than one in every ten claimed they lived positively, according to a Gallup poll.

It was therefore not accidental that over 17 million participated in the mass protests between June 30 and July 3, 2013, which led to Morsi’s removal. Of course, the military top echelon, led by Abdul-Fatah al-Sisi, riding on the wave of the protests hijacked the movement and took over government on July 3; this is not the end of the story. In reality the military, only relied on the lack of a clear-cut working class political party and the failure of the labour movement in Egypt to take power. The Tamarod group, which led the movement, aside lacking any genuine working class character and orientation also comprised of elements and groups associated with the Mubarak regime and the military. When the military formed an interim government, and launched counter-attacks on the protesting MB members, Tamarod was represented in the government and kept mum on the terror launched by the military against the MB members, in which over two thousands were reportedly killed and several thousand others detained and injured. Also, when the military regime launched attack on Suez Steel workers in August, arresting their leaders and using the soldiers to occupy the place, the Tamarod did not support the workers.

All of these shows that the Tamarod and other pro-regime groups were only civil society cover for the capitalist class to behead the revolution. Of course, the military has been able to crush the MB forces, but this is not the end of the issue. More militant section of the Islamists, seeing no way of getting power through electoral and political process, may turn towards terrorism, with far reaching implication for not just the revolution and Egypt, but also for the whole Middle East. But along with this also is the growing radicalization that will accompany the failure of the military and the so-called interim “technocratic” government (read neo-liberal dictatorship), formed on July 3, 2013 and led by the Supreme Court judge, Adly Mansor. The military’s excuse of staging a coup: avoiding bloodshed is now becoming a fiction to majority as more people have been killed since Morsi was ousted than during the Mubarak ouster. Moreover, the government of austerity and neo-liberalism to be fully launched will see social crisis growing.

Libya: Neither Qaddafi not imperialism
If there is any country where stalemate defined the MENA revolt, it is Libya. The involvement of the western imperialist forces through NATO in the Libyan revolts has complicated matters and cast a terrible shadow over the future of the revolution in the country. The revolt, which started in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi on genuine basis at its early period, was unfortunately hijacked by western capitalist imperialism, not only to re-establish itself in the country, but to put itself in the radar of the MENA revolts and halt their catastrophic effects on the global capitalist relations. Of course, the intervention of imperialism has also given some other regimes, especially that of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, an excuse by using anti-western imperialist propaganda to maneuver against the mass uprising in the country. While the Libyan strongman, Muammar Qaddafi was murdered in mid-October, by the so-called rebels under the supervision of the US/NATO forces; and ‘victory’ declared by the fig leaf National Transition Council (NTC), the last has not been heard of the Libyan revolt. However, a trajectory of the Libyan events needs to be chronicled to get the direction in which our analyses will take.

The Libyan uprising started on a comical note. You see a flamboyant Qaddafi condemning millions of youth and working people who toppled his friend and compatriot, Hosni Mubarak (and boasting of the impermeability of Libyan soil to any revolt); only for the same regime to face its greatest uprising unprecedented in more than forty years of the regime’s existence. Indeed, comedy was never short of the Qaddafi’s life and regime, the last of which was his admonition to his supporters to visits the revolting masses, who he referred to as “rats” with death, only for himself to be killed just like a rat by some gun wielding rabble rousers. The Libyan social upheaval, which started on 15th February, 2011, was instigated by Qaddafi’s chest-thumping and insult on Libyans that they can never revolt. But in actual fact, it was a response to the debilitating and worsening economic conditions coupled with the suffocating repressive and totalitarian character of the highly corrupt and rotten regime, took a more drastic and challenging nature.

The protests that ignited the revolt started from the suburb of Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, but spread like wildfire across the country, even up to Tripoli (where close to a quarter of the population live). The Qaddafi regime, with enough confidence (and of course having Egypt at the back of the mind), viciously attacked the protesting mass and tried to retake the Benghazi city, an action which the masses staunchly resisted. Against the widespread terror by the Qaddafi forces, the soldiers and the pilots in the eastern region joined the uprising and thus began a civil war. This in itself reflected Lenin’s prognosis of a revolutionary situation in which the masses not only show uncommon courage and determination, but also resulting in the ranks of the armed forces being sharply divided with a considerable layer of the low level officers joining the revolt, while even the ranks of the ruling class is sharply divided. All of these were clearly manifested in the Libyan uprising.

However, the high ranking military and bureaucracy officers that deserted Qaddafi later found accommodation with imperialism, no thanks to the sidelining of the mass of the working and oppressed people, and indeed rank and file soldiers who risked their lives for the uprising against massive state terror. Initially, the regime was able to regain some towns in the east, the fact is that had there been better organization and mobilization of support not only in the rest of Libya but indeed throughout the Middle East, Africa and the West, Qaddafi regime would have been defeated without imperialist intervention. In spite these situations, the revolt refused to go away. The mass of people, including women organized into local councils and had night vigils. By February 26, 2011, an interim government had been set up with some influence of the working class, middle class, youths and defected soldiers on decision-making, including organization of defence, propaganda, fuel supply, etc. The interim government was extremely loose and could not have existed without the mass involvement.

Consequent upon massive global outcry against widespread brutality and killings by the Qaddafi regime, the western imperialist powers, which had earlier been confounded by the developments in Egypt and Tunisia, suddenly found their voices in Libya. This gave them opportunity to influence the revolts spreading while also seeking total control over Libyan oil (which Qaddafi had used as a bait to play various imperialist powers). Thus, the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1973, establishing a ‘No Fly Zone’ over Libya, gave a green light for an imperialist military adventure in Libya. Since then, imperialist nations – France, Britain, Italy and US – have undertaken massive military exercise in the country, which wrought massive damages not only Qaddafi’s military facilities and capacities but also on infrastructures built several years back.

Also civilians on both sides of the conflict have been killed by the imperialist forces. Politically, imperialism tried to create the opposition in its image, with rank-and-file influence replaced with elite and pro-imperialist leadership (comprising many elements from Qaddafi’s defunct regime). The military campaign, though initially rejected by a layer among working class and young revolutionaries, was later allowed with the false hope that it could help remove Qaddafi. Although, the rebels, with the supports of some Arab Gulf states and imperialism (which gave military support in terms of training and logistics to the rebels) were able to defeat Qaddafi forces and consequently kill Qaddafi himself, this has not done away with crisis in the country. Indeed, Qaddafi was able to maintain hold in the west for such a long time, especially in Tripoli, because of lack of working class control and mass movement in Tripoli and other towns in the west. This easily gave imperialism the opportunity to deepen its control and influence in the opposition movement and the revolution in general. Indeed, a layer of youth in such cities as Sirte waged an armed struggle against the opposition, because aside the Qaddafi factor (Qaddafi is from Sirte and had shifted his fast-crumbling government to Sirte); they see the opposition forces as being sponsored by imperialism.

The imperialist military campaign had contradictory outcomes: it undermined the support of Qaddafi, as continued attack increased the disillusionment of Qaddafi’s passive supporters, because they could see no end in sight with the seemingly perpetual violence as long as Qaddafi was there. This in itself would subsequently generate a rethinking by this section, thus undermining the support base of Qaddafi. On the other hand, the victories gained by the rank and file of the opposition emboldened them to wanting to take control of situation and demand the ouster of the imperialist forces. This is glaring from the speed with which imperialism withdrew from the country after Qaddafi had been killed on October 20, 2011 in Sirte.

But the death of Qaddafi, rather than move the society forward, has actually exposed the bankruptcy of imperialist intervention. Just like in Saddam’s Iraq, the death of Qaddafi has opened up a new era of sectarianism and religious fundamentalism. Qaddafi had relied on blancing among various tribal and clan forces to maintain his grip on power. Using huge oil wealth, he bought off many tribal leaders, while at the same time using state repressive apparatus to keep them in check. More than this, he played the politics of divide-and-rule, pitching tribe leaders and various religious groups (Salafists and Sufis) against one another. Moreover, various strands of regional tribal forces and terrorist groups, operating under religious and state covers, were used by Qaddafi in his regional expansionist agenda. For instance, ethnic Tuareg from Mali were used by Qaddafi as militia within not only Libya, but also in other countries by Qaddafi, prior to the Libyan revolt. The death of Qaddafi only opened up these fissures. For instance, as a result of the brutal suppression of various sections of the country and the divide-and-rule tactics (favouring some areas over the other) employed by Qaddafi, there has been growing secessionist tendency in some part of the country, especially the eastern Libya, where most of the oil wealth is located. There has been growing demand for semi-autonomy in some of these regions. Added to this is the role of the various imperialist-backed and Gulf States-sponsored rebels, many of whom are religious militants. Many of the militants along with some defected soldiers, having elbowed aside the genuine movement of the people, have turned themselves into messianic nuisance in the country. They want to create a new religious society through anarchy. Therefore, the post- Qaddafi Libya is now torn between sectarianism and religious fundamentalism.

The new pro-imperialist leadership does not have the authority to control the situation. Aside the fact that these new ruling elites were imposed by imperialism on the populace, they are mostly associated with the Qaddafi regime. Moreover, because of their failure to move the society forward by rebuilding the economy, coupled with their pro-capitalist orientation, they do not have mass base to confront these situations. Moreover, as a result of Qaddafi legacy, the army is in ruin, and most of the conscripts into the army are those who do not have jobs. Therefore, the government is weak politically and economically. This in itself has posed serious challenge to the ability of imperialism, especially the US, to get full hold of the oil wealth of the country. For instance, US consulate was attacked in September 11, 2012 by people suspected to be terrorists, who felt betrayed by their isolation, killing the Ambassador, Chris Stevens and three others. Moreover, there has been growing terrorist attacks including suicide bombing, while assassinations of government and military figures are becoming rampant. Moreover, various fundamentalists, some suspected to be loyal to some politicians, have been enforcing Islamic law, Shari’a, on people. There has also been growing attacks on various religious trends like the Sufis and Copts. By October 2012, a militia group, Warfalla seized control of Bani Walid, only for government to rout group in November. There have also been continued street violence, and violence among various groups including some pro-Qaddafi groups and government-legalized militias. According to a Wikipedia.com estimate, between 1, 066 and 1, 079 people, including four Americans, have been killed in the last two years. All this is a sign of growing degeneration in the society. The election that brought in new government in October 2012 has not actually helped matters. The results of the general elections, held on July 7, 2012 have seen various religious groups winning significant seats. Although, the Muslim Brotherhood groups did not win majority in the election, but the votes were shared among various religious groups, and some pro-West groups.

All this reflects the bankruptcy and failure of imperialist intervention. The so-called humanitarian intervention has not only wrought destruction of infrastructures and the economy, but has also unleashed various divisive forces that are threatening the very existence of the country. Imperialism and its lapdogs Arab states – in a bid to oust Qaddafi – have employed the forces of ultra-right wing rebels, which have now become monster to not just the society, but also to imperialism. It is one thing for imperialist to use the cover of mass uprising against Qaddafi to oust him. It is completely another thing for mass of people, through their mass movements, to dethrone an unwanted dictator and collectively decide how they want their country be governed. The former only opens up various divisive tendencies that seek to revive old wounds, while the later unite people against not just the remnant of the old regime, by in fact its international bastion.

Moreover, the current situation has exposed the clear absence of genuine working class platform, and mass left political platform to unite the country together under the banner of social programmes and rebuilding of the society in the interests of the majority. The labour movement in the country is just emerging while left movement is weak, if at all it functions. However, as a result of the economic history of the country vis-à-vis provision of basic needs of the people, even if they were subsequently eroded by Qaddafi’s adoption of capitalism, has the effect of playing a role in evoking mass movement. As said earlier, the current pro-capitalist leaders are going to launch attack on the welfare benefits to the people as part of the transition to full neo-liberal capitalism, and in order to create a nouveau riche class. This will be met by mass movements. Already, oil workers, organized under a union are fighting government over pay and welfare packages. The government’s attempt at reducing benefit for the students and the unemployed will surely evoke mass movements of youth. Of course, the new government, learning from the revolt, may try many tactics, not the least, divisive introduction of neo-liberal policies or gradual introduction of these policies. However, the class interest of the new ruling class and the sustenance of the limited welfare policies of Qaddafi will create serious contradiction that no divisive tactics can prevent for long. This therefore necessitates the building of mass organizations of the working and oppressed people, including trade unions, youth and student movement, and left platforms, to prepare and start building towards revolutionary movement. The rise in working class movement, even if it has not been on the same pedestal as Tunisia or Egypt, is showing prospect, that may turn around things in the coming period. However, failure of this can only mean further degeneration of the society.

Syrian Uprising: The limits of State Repression
If the contradiction defines the Libyan revolt, the Syrian situation seems more alarming and gory, with the degeneration of the revolt into a never-ending civil war. The belief of Bashir Al Assad’s regime that it could rely on anti-US sentiments to build up its popularity, and undermine the genuine movement against the regime, has wiped off in its face, even when the revolt has been derailed by imperialism and its allies in the Middle East. While the al-Assad regime tries to present US imperialism as the source of the regime’s woes, it has refused to justify its annexing of Lebanon for decades until driven out by mass movement in 2005. In the real sense, the mass disenchantment with the regime is a reflection of deep-seated anger against more than a decade of neo-liberal, brazen capitalist policies adopted by the regime. This coupled with the repressive, totalitarian regime of the Assad family has created a widespread bitterness. Meanwhile, this country was hitherto known for massive state intervention in the economy, and provision of basic services like jobs, education, healthcare, etc., even if under a totalitarian and undemocratic state machine. This is one of the legacies of the Nasserite orientation of the senior Assad, who ruled for close to 30 years. Despite the repressive and undemocratic rule of the senior Assad (who ordered the massacre of tens of thousands of Syrians in Homs in the 1980s, in an attempt to suppress the uprising in the area), the provision of basic needs of the people, including jobs, made the regime to buy time. It was this that the junior Assad used as a platform to gain power. However, as a result of the fall in oil resources, the regime, lacking long-term planning and controlled by corrupt elements tilted towards the neo-liberal (free market) phase of global capitalism, which meant under funding of hitherto available public services, growth in unemployment and growth in inequality.

The protests in Syria started on the 26th January, 2011. Though influenced by the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, but the Syrian revolt is majorly against the repressive and the increasing capitalist government of Al Assad, his brother and their ruling clique. Therefore, the protests emphasize the demand for job and against repression, political and civil rule restoration and end to the emergency rule in place since 1963 (during the rule of the senior Al Assad). On March 15, 2011, thousands of protesters gathered in Damascus, Alleppo, al Hasakah, Dara’a, Deir-ez-Zur and Hama. There were massive repressions through arrests and killing of protesters by the regime (using snipers, military and state-run militias). Attempts by the regime to portray the protesters as mere rabble-rousers at the beginning failed, as they (protesters) used their strength and courage to destroy all propaganda of the regime. For instance, on 18th March, thousands marched on the streets of Syria chanting “God, Syria, that’s enough” to challenge the pro-regime slogan of ‘God, Syria, Bashar Assad, that’s enough”.

Initially, there was a level of support for Assad regime especially in Damascus and Alleppo, due to the believe that the regime still represent a bulwark against the US-Israeli imperialism in the Middle East. This is a reflection of the treacherous roles of US imperialism in the Middle East and the Arab World; a record which is repulsive to the Arab masses who have been kept under the humiliating subjugation of US and European imperialism for decades in coalition with their rulers. This made someone like Assad, who has support from Iran and Russia, to act like an anti-imperialist spokesperson. This coupled with former progressive state economic policies (just as Qaddafi had some supports in Tripoli), where social and public infrastructures were made available to a greater percentage of the population. While the social welfare has been dismantled since the adoption of the brazen capitalist policies by the regime, some section of the population believed the regime would defend some remnant of the old welfare state. Moreover, the dubious roles of US and European imperialism in the mass uprising made many Syrians, especially in the most cosmopolitan cities like Damascus to be wary of openly supporting the revolt. This is aside massive state repression carried out by the regime in areas of the revolts especially in Homs.

Another factor is the role of the divisive politics of the Assad regime. Assad relied on his Alawite tribe as the bulwark of his regime. These kinds of supports are gotten through patronage system and nepotism that ensures allegiance premised on base and primordial sentiments. For instance, it was reported that most of the top military and political appointments and business patronages go to the Bashar Assad’s Alawi tribe, which is just about 20 percent of the population while fewer posts and jobs go to the other tribes including the over 70 percent Sunni population. This ethnic divisive politics may be positive for Assad (and its Iranian supporters), but this is simply ephemeral. As the massive repression of the regime continued, several layers of even his blind supporters became disillusioned. 

In spite all this, there were huge spiraling protests in Damascus and Aleppo. For instance, “on the day (Bashar) Assad made a public speech on 20 June, 2011, there were angry reactions and opposition demonstrations in 19 Syrian cities including Damascus, with crowd chanting “liar”. In the speech, Assad had referred to the protesters as unwilling tools in the hands of foreign distracters and armed gangs. While vaguely claiming to wanting to reform, Assad regime only used fake promises as carrots while carrying out large-scale (or ‘scorch earth’ policy) terror against the protesters. According the latest estimate by international human rights groups, over 200, 000 people have been killed (of course with some military and security men killed by both the section of the discredited opposition, and the state forces) while millions have been injured and displaced. Villages have been destroyed by the regime’s elite forces (commandeered by Bashar’s brother, Maher) and the pro-regime Alawite’s militia gang, Sabiha. Tens of Thousands of Syrians have fled to neighbouring countries like Lebanon and Turkey. At a point, the regime used the excuse of murder of 120 soldiers by so-called armed gang, to unleash large scale terror destroying villages such as Jisr al-Shughour.

All this brings back to mind the terror carried out by Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad and uncle, Rifaat in Hama in 1982 where over 20, 000 estimated deaths were recorded, in an attempt to quell uprising of Sunnis in the city. Rifaat, a multi-millionaire, is now living in Britain with no criminal charge brought against him. This policy of selective justice of the western imperialist powers is based on their imperialist and capitalist interests. This explains the approach of the western powers to the Syrian regime. Unsure of its victory in Libya and events in Tunisia and Egypt, the western imperialism, at the beginning of the revolt, tried to choose its words carefully on the Syrian regime despite the obvious criminality being carried out by the regime. You hear such statement from Obama as “Syrian regime must reform”. This is meant to court the regime away from the influence of Iran, as Syria is seen as a vital link to the rest of the Middle East. However, with increasing victory in Libya, and having seen the worst of the revolution in Egypt and Tunisia, the western power got more emboldened to take up Syria, possibly militarily. This is being challenged by Russia and China (which is seeking extension of its minimal influence, as a result of its economic growth in the past two decades), who refused to endorse a military adventure in Syria.

While the murderous repression carried out by the senior Assads were against a part of the country, the current crisis is national in character has refused to go away, with the armed groups rising from the state terror to challenge the regime’s legitimate right to violence. By early October, 2011 a renegade colonel, who defected from the regime forces announced the formation of a Free Army (a term used by the young officers, led by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, who overthrew the pro-imperialist regime in 1952). Of course, his call for the western forces to support and arm the Free Army against the regime reflected its orientation – i.e. towards imperialism and neo-colonial Arab regimes. But far before this time, armed groups (comprising defected military men and working class elements) rising from the state terror have organized actions against the regime, just like the working masses and youths had taken arms against Qaddafi forces, far before the imperialist forces through the NTC, exploited this to influence the movement. The bankruptcy of the western power and its puppet NTC in Libya will ignite new wave of reaction and possibly revolt in the country, and will show to the Syrians that their victory lies not in the hands of western power but in their own well-organized, pan-national movement encompassing Sunnis, Alawis, and other tribes and minorities. Subsequent movements and revolts in Egypt and Tunisia, which have seen elected governments fall clearly shows that revolutions, aside gaining inspiration from similar development als learn from other examples. It needs to be mentioned that while organized armed resistance is not ruled out during revolts and revolutions (against the repressive apparatus of the state), such must be under the democratic control of the masses; and should be subset of the wider mass movements.

The result to brazen brigandage and open terror by the Assad’s regime reflects the level of weakness of the regime than strength. Unlike in the 1980’s when the state still guarantee social infrastructures and services like education, health care, jobs, food, etc, the current economic arrangement undertaken by the Bashar Assad regime, especially since early 2000, has meant economic dislocation for many  – lack of jobs, growing poverty, etc. This coupled with unmitigated repression and dictatorship of the regime – including its divisive policies and politics (even before the revolts) – are the underlining cause of the revolt, which was triggered by the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt. Even the regime, which initially portrayed itself as popular (with display of mobilized supporters on cable televisions, especially Press TV) while portraying the protesting masses as mere rabble rousers, had to tacitly agree that it is not in total control. It has, several times, had to agree to so-called ‘reform’; reflecting a beleaguered regime. Press TV, the Iranian state media organization, despite its open support for the Assad regime, had to, at least, agree that the country was divided into two. More revealing was its report that those supporting the regime were mainly concerned about the unknown (i.e. the fear of anarchy if Assad is toppled). While these conservative observations were true, they also reflected the lack of an independent platform of the working and oppressed people in Syria to organize the revolution and prepare a kind of working people government needed. Indeed, it is this situation the troubled Assad regime was exploiting on to sustain itself in power. This implies that had there been a pan-national, democratic platform of the working and oppressed people with a clear programme of organization of the society including putting the economy under public control and ownership, and confiscation of the wealth of the superrich, it would have gained mass echo and completely isolated the regime and its sponsors. Of course, the mass uprising rose from tens of thousands to millions, a national general strike of workers will surely ring a death knell for the regime. At the peak of the movement, the strength of the revolts was expressed in the way it has grown; every repression and mass murder of the regime was met by a heroic expression of mass anger